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In 1987, the United States Sentencing Commission took what was sup-
posed to be "the first step in an evolutionary process"' whose ultimate goal
was to establish rational policies and guidelines for criminal sentencing. The
Sentencing Commission began its work by establishing guidelines and poli-
cies for sentencing natural persons. It now has proceeded to consider sen-
tencing guidelines for corporations.' The consideration of penalties for
corporations began with a "discussion draft" containing a proposal for sen-
tencing guidelines for corporations,3 and proceeded to public hearings on the
topic in October and November of 1988. A year later, in November, 1989,
events took a different turn as the Sentencing Commission itself published its
own "Preliminary Draft" for the sentencing of organizational defendants.4
The central organizing premise of the 1989 Preliminary Draft is that cor-
porations should be punished more severely for crimes than they have been
in the past. According to Jeffrey S. Parker, a former Deputy Chief Counsel
to the United States Sentencing Commission, and Michael K. Block, a for-
mer Member of the United States Sentencing Commission, "the 1989 propo-
sal simply suggests very high-and apparently arbitrary-fine amounts." 5
The 1989 guidelines reflected a highly publicized effort by the Sentencing
* J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School.
' United States Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Guidelines for United States
Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 18,049 (1987).
2 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, DISCUSSION MATERIALS ON ORGANIZATIONAL
SANCTIONS (1988).
3 While the guidelines discussed in this paper refer to all forms of business
organizations and not just to firms doing business in the corporate form, at times I use the
term "corporation" because it is convenient to do so. Also, as a statistical matter,
virtually all organizational offenders are business corporations. See Memorandum from
David A. Lombardero and Jeffrey S. Parker to Members of the U.S. Sentencing
Commission ("All Commissioners") on Principles for Organizational Sentencing 2 (Jan.
27, 1988) (on file with author).
4 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZATIONAL
DEFENDANTS (preliminary draft, Nov. 1989).
1 Parker & Block, The Sentencing Commission, P.M. (Post-Mistretta): Sunshine or
Sunset?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 289, 322 (1990).
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Commission to portray itself as "tough on lawbreakers." 6 The effort was an
unmitigated success. The sentencing schedule was "far heavier than any
business executive would have imagined possible."7 Fines were set as high as
$364 million, and convicted organizations also could have been sentenced to
a unique form of "probation," that allowed courts to assume effective con-
trol of the daily operations of corporations whose managers actively partici-
pated in certain crimes.'
The original plan contained two alternatives for setting fines on convicted
organizations. Under the first alternative, fines would equal two to three
times the illicit profits or the amount of damage caused by a corporation in
the course of its criminal activities. The amount of the fine would vary
according to the presence or absence of a number of "aggravating" 9 or "miti-
gating"1 factors. Each aggravating or mitigating factor could raise or lower
the fine by ten to fifty percent." Under the second alternative, fines would
be set according to a thirty-two level scale. The fine would vary according to
the severity of the offense. Under this system, the offense level for any par-
ticular crime would be raised or lowered according to the aggravating and
mitigating factors employed under the first alternative.
The business community reacted strongly to the Sentencing Commission's
original proposal. The National Association of Manufacturers testified
before the Commission that the proposed guidelines were "extremely harsh,
punitive, unwarranted and... place[d] many businesses on the threshold of
insolvency."' 2 The Corporate Counsel Association took an equally harsh
line, commenting that judges "do not have the training, experience, or time
to run companies in the manner the suggested conditions of probation would
require."" By March, 1990, the Sentencing Commission responded to this
pressure by issuing a new set of proposed guidelines that were at least mar-
ginally milder.
Notably, the Sentencing Commission's proposal for organizational sanc-
tions was wholly devoid of empirical or theoretical foundation. Its proposals
were politically oriented, rather than policy oriented. Indeed, if nothing
else, the process of establishing sentencing guidelines has made it clear that
6 Corporations Face Stiffer Sentencing: Panel Gets Tough on Lawbreakers, Wash. Post,
Nov. 8, 1989, at BI, col. 1.
I Etzioni, Going Soft on Corporate Crime, Wash. Post, Apr. 1, 1990 (Outposts), at C3.
8 Id.
9 Aggravating factors include the "active involvement of high-level management in the
crime, prior convictions, cover-ups during an investigation, and endangerment of an
entire consumer market." Id.
10 Mitigating factors include "prompt reporting of an offense, reasonable ignorance of
a crime by top management, organizational policies forbidding such offenses, and timely
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the work of the Sentencing Commission has entered the realm of special-
interest politics. As a result, the process of establishing sentencing guide-
lines has followed a pattern quite familiar to political scientists. The initial
regulatory foray served to increase the notoriety of the relevant regulatory
agency by attracting the press attention that usually accompanies threats to
impose huge costs on an industry or interest group. This initial foray also
attracted the attention of the relevant interest groups. The regulatory
agency, having tested the regulatory waters, then proceeded to hold public
hearings, which served as an auction, whose purpose was to customize the
regulatory scheme to the interests of the highest bidders.' 4 Where conflict-
ing interests clashed, compromise resulted.
The politicization of the Sentencing Commission's efforts to promulgate
guidelines for corporations is ironic in light of the Supreme Court's decision
in Mistretta v. United States.15 There, the Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Sentencing Commission against a challenge that its existence violated
the constitutionally mandated Separation of Powers. The Court opined that
the presence of federal judges on the Commission did not politicize the judi-
ciary because the Commission itself was viewed as "essentially neutral."' 6
As such, judicial membership on the Commission did not threaten the
impartiality of the judicial branch because
[t]he Sentencing Commission is devoted exclusively to the development
of rules to rationalize a process that has been and will continue to be
performed exclusively by the Judicial Branch. In our view this is an
essentially neutral endeavor and one in which judicial participation is
peculiarly appropriate.'
Justice Scalia took a much different and more pragmatic view of the role
of the Sentencing Commission. Writing in dissent, he recognized that the
Commission, and its judicial membership, inevitably would find itself
14 While public hearings by an agency do not resemble an auction in the sense that
interest groups trade cash for regulatory forbearance, the public hearing process is
analogous to an auction because both methods of allocating rights produce the same
results. Public hearings do not produce discussion and comment from randomly
distributed sectors of the population. Rather, those groups with the most at stake on a
particular issue will express themselves most forcefully. When, as is so often the case, a
proposed regulatory scheme distributes gains to a concentrated group in society, and
imposes costs on a widely diffuse group or groups, only the group that stands to gain will
make itself heard in the "public hearing" process. And, needless to say, these groups will
not present an unbiased rendition of the relative merits of competing regulatory schemes.
This skewing of information flow is a sufficient condition for causing the public hearing
process to resemble an auction. Thus, because the public officials conducting the auction
hear only one side of an issue, their thinking on an issue is likely to be systematically
distorted in favor of the group with the most at stake.
15 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
16 Id. at 407.
1 Id.
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entwined in political issues. Thus, he would have struck down the Act creat-
ing the Sentencing Commission as a violation of the Separation of Powers.
In particular, Justice Scalia felt that the Sentencing Commission was "a sort
of junior-varsity Congress,"'" whose un-elected and unaccountable member-
ship would be entrusted with political decisions that Congress would prefer
not to have to make.19
This was not the way it was supposed to be, of course. Under the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act, the Sentencing Commission is required by law to establish
sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal justice system that,
among other things, would "provide certainty and fairness, '20 and "reflect,
to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it
relates to the criminal justice process.' Moreover, the Sentencing Reform
Act "is as clear as any legislative product could be in the expression of a
mandate [for the Commission] to 'do efficiency.' "22 The conclusion is ines-
capable that guidelines and policies for criminal sentencing must be efficient
if they are to be rational. After all, the criminal law itself is essentially eco-
nomic in nature: its goal is to force people to internalize the costs of their
own actions. 3
Because the Sentencing Commission is dependent on Congress for its very
survival, it is not surprising that its actions have become so highly
politicized. The Commission had a precarious beginning especially because,
from its inception until Mistretta, its constitutionality had been in question.
Unlike many other regulatory agencies, the Sentencing Commission lacks a
natural constituency who might be expected to fight for its survival. Because
it lacks an interest group constituency, the political costs to Congress of dis-
posing of the Sentencing Commission would be very low. The Commission,
therefore, must be very careful to avoid activities that are antithetical to
congressional interests. With this in mind, it is not surprising that the Com-
mission's activities have become politicized. And, for this reason, it is also
highly doubtful that the Sentencing Commission will produce guidelines that
are an improvement over the existing sentencing practices of federal judges.
The purpose of this Article is to show that, despite whatever political
appeal the subject may have, corporate sentencing is an inappropriate topic
18 Id. at 427 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19 Id. For an explanation of why Congress might prefer to delegate certain decisions
to administrative agencies or to states, see Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators
and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of
Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265 (1990).
20 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(l)(B) (1988).
21 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C) (1988).
22 Parker & Block, supra note 5, at 292.
23 See Parker, Criminal Sentencing Policy for Organizations: The Unifying Approach of
Optimal Penalties, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 513, 553 (1989) ("Criminal conduct is
prohibited mainly because of the external harm or loss that it imposes on persons other
than the offender, including both victims in the narrow sense and society at large.").
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for the attention of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. I will show that this
conclusion would obtain even if the Commission were insulated from the
pressures of the politicalmarketplace, which it is not. In addition, the analy-
sis in this Article casts considerable doubt on the conventional assumption
among legal scholars, including law and economics scholars, that corporate
shareholders invariably benefit from corporate crime. While it is true that
shareholders benefit ex post when criminal activity goes undetected, it is not
at all clear that shareholders benefit ex ante from such activity. The agency
cost perspective taken in this Article makes clear that the most plausible
explanation for corporate crime, at least in the large, publicly held corpora-
tion, stems from a deviation of interest between managers and shareholders.
The Article begins with a discussion of how agency theory can provide
insights into the question of organizational sanctions. Agency theory is an
elemental part of the modern theory of corporate finance. An understanding
of agency theory is essential to any inquiry into the behavior of corporate
actors. Applying basic principles of agency theory to the issue of criminal
sanctions yields two insights. First, corporate officers and directors have a
natural proclivity to refrain from taking risks. Engaging in criminal activity
is a form of risk-taking. Excessive enforcement can exacerbate this procliv-
ity toward excessive risk avoidance, in turn, stifling innovation and creativity
and leading to a general decline in social wealth.
The second critical insight provided by agency theory is that corporate
actors do not engage in criminal activity to benefit the firms for which they
work but to benefit themselves. In some, but not all cases, these activities
will benefit the firms for which the corporate actors work. But the basic
motivation for the behavior is self-interest. Corporate actors may engage in
criminal activities that, if undetected, will benefit their firms but this activity
may not make shareholders better off ex ante. In other words, corporate
actors' criminal behavior will sometimes benefit a firm and will sometimes
harm a firm. The real aim of criminal behavior by organizations is to
advance the careers of the responsible corporate actors. It is against these
actors that the primary criminal sanction should be levied.
This Article does not conclude that imposing criminal liability on corpo-
rations is always a bad idea. Rather, the point here is that agency theory
makes clear that the issue of corporate criminal liability is more complex
than it appears at first blush. We are more likely to attain rational and con-
sistent treatment for organizational defendants by allowing judges to work
on an incremental, case-by-case basis than by requiring them to adhere to a
set of guidelines that do not take full account of the varying circumstances of
individual firms and their agents.
Part I of this paper contains a basic introduction to agency theory. This
Part, which contains the core of the analysis, elaborates on the risk-aversion
and self-interest insights mentioned above. Part II discusses the relationship
between agency theory and optimal penalty theory as those theories relate to
the criminal culpability of organizations. This Part makes the observation
that, taken together, the insights of optimal penalty theory and agency the-
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ory suggest that it is inappropriate to view corporations as risk-neutral in the
context of corporate crime. In fact, such organizations should be viewed as
risk-averse, since the relevant decision-makers in these firms are risk-averse.
Making the assumption that corporations are risk neutral can lead to sub-
optimal sanctions.
I. AGENCY THEORY AND THE CRIMINAL CORPORATION
A. Agency Theory in General
Lawyers and financial economists are quite familiar with the concept of
agency. Within the context of corporate finance theory, an agency relation-
ship arises in any contractual setting in which one or more persons (the prin-
cipals) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service that
requires the agent to make decisions on behalf of the principals.' Within
the context of the publicly held corporation, financial economists consider
shareholders to be principals and officers and directors to be their agents.
Michael Jensen and William Meckling made a seminal contribution to
agency cost theory by developing a model that focuses attention on the
moment a privately held firm goes public.' They argue that after the firm
has sold shares to the public, one expects that the existing group of managers
will continue to run the firm. But the public sale of shares creates an agency
problem, because once a firm goes public, the interests of the firm's share-
holders and its managers diverge. The shareholders want the managers to
keep their collective noses to the grindstone, while managers may want to
engage in leisure time activities, and divert portions of the firm's resources to
their private use. Under this model, the agency problem can manifest itself
in a number of ways. Wednesday afternoon golf outings, country club mem-
berships for top executives, and corporate jets, for example, may all serve
valid corporate purposes, but they may also represent a deviation between
the interests of principals and agents.
Besides the somewhat obvious manifestations of the agency problem men-
tioned above, agency problems arise more subtly in firms' corporate financ-
ing decisions. Perhaps the most important way that the conflict between
shareholder/principals and manager/agents manifests itself is in the differ-
ent ways in which the two groups view risk. Shareholders can reduce the
risk associated with individual stock holdings in particular firms by owning a
fully diversified portfolio of securities. As a consequence, shareholders are
in a position to benefit from risky investments undertaken by the firm. By
contrast, firms' managers have invested their own "human capital" in the
21 Spence & Zeckhauser, Insurance, Information and IndividualAction, 61 AM. ECON.
REv. 119 (1971).
25 Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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firms for which they work.26 These managers hold undiversified investments
in their firm in the form of their own human capital.
Because they hold undiversified investments, corporate managers are
likely to be more risk averse than corporate shareholders. This divergence
creates a form of agency cost. For example, some commentators have sug-
gested that the conglomerate merger wave of the 1960's, in which many
American corporations sought merger partners in wholly unrelated indus-
tries, could best be explained on the basis of agency theory.' The large
conglomerate provided managers with the benefits of diversification, because
even if some units within the conglomerate structure fared poorly, other
units would fare well. Shareholders neither needed nor wanted to pay for
this diversification because they could diversify their own portfolios.
Jensen and Meckling's insight was that, when a firm sells its shares to the
public, rational investors will be unwilling to pay a price for the firm's shares
that reflects its full value in the hands of a single owner-manager.A Rather,
the public investor, anticipating future divergences of interest between him-
self and the firm's managers, will pay the full value less the amount of the
anticipated agency costs.' The important point here is that the initial own-
ers who sell the firm's shares to the public bear the entire cost associated
with the agency relationship. The cost comes in the form of the discount
that prospective shareholders take when they invest in a firm in which man-
agers' behavior will possibly deviate from a strategy of maximizing share-
holder wealth.
The implication of Jensen and Meckling's insight into who bears the costs
of the agency relationship is that initial owners have strong incentives to
make credible promises that they will refrain from taking actions that
diverge from shareholders' interests in order to increase the value they
receive when going public. Managers can agree to certain operating rules, to
budget restrictions, or to incentive compensation policies that provide assur-
ances to shareholders that they will maximize firm value.
Managers can also agree to such things as independent directors, audit
committees composed of independent directors, and regular visits by outside
directors in order to reassure investors. But all of these devices are costly.
For that reason, eliminating agency costs entirely is not in anybody's inter-
est. Rather, it will pay to reduce agency costs only up to the point at which
the next dollar spent on agency cost reduction garners one additional dollar
26 "Human capital" simply refers to the process of investing in obtaining valuable
skills. Economists consider the years one spends in law school to be investments in
human capital. Some human capital skills are generic, in the sense that they easily can be
transferred from one job to another. Certain other human capital skills are thought to be
firm-specific because they are valuable only to one particular firm.
27 Amihud & Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers,
12 BELL J. ECON. 605 (1981).
28 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 25, at 313.
29 Id.
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in shareholder wealth. For example, it would not make sense to spend
$100,000 to assure that a manager will refrain from engaging in an activity
that costs the firm only $25,000.
Jensen and Meckling call the resources spent by managers to reduce
agency costs "bonding expenditures."'  These expenditures include such
things as incentive compensation contracts and personal legal liability for
violations of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. In addition, sharehold-
ers will expend resources to monitor the activities of corporate management.
The costs of these monitoring and bonding expenditures reduce the value of
the firm below what it would be in a perfect world. Putting all of this
together, one can more precisely define the term "agency costs" as the sum
of all monitoring expenditures by the principal and the bonding expenditures
by the agent, plus the residual loss that exists because it is simply
uneconomical to eliminate all agency costs completely through monitoring
and bonding. The Jensen and Meckling agency cost analysis reveals finally
that devising new ways of reducing agency costs leads to economic gains.
In this context, corporate criminal activity may have net benefits for pub-
lic shareholders because any revenue obtained from the activity inures to the
shareholders. Since public shareholders generally bear no responsibility for
a manager's crime, "they will have every incentive to hire managers willing
to commit crimes on the corporation's behalf."'" Thus, viewed from an
agency cost perspective, shareholders may not be as vigilant about policing
corporate crime as one might hope. On the other hand, managers them-
selves have strong incentives to refrain from engaging in criminal activity.
B. Risk Aversion and Corporate Criminal Conduct
One of the ways in which agency costs manifest themselves is in the form
of excessive risk-aversion by corporate actors. Thus a very basic implication
of agency theory is that criminal activity by corporations will be exceedingly
rare. Even with the most generous managerial compensation scheme in
place, corporate actors must share the gains associated with any corporate
criminal activity with their shareholders. On the other hand, the corporate
actors face extremely high personal costs if they are caught engaging in
criminal activity.
Thus, the most interesting question associated with corporate criminal
activity is not how harshly it should be punished, but rather why it ever
takes place at all. Before answering this question it is important to note that
corporate criminal misconduct is rare. A study of corporate crime that
defined crime broadly enough to include any corporate action punished by
the government in any way, revealed only 1,283 convictions for corporate
30 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 25, at 308.
31 POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 398 (3d ed. 1986).
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crimes between 1984 and 1987.2 Indeed, the number of organizational pros-
ecutions is so rare that an outside counsel to the U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion expressed the view that "a predominantly empirical approach relying
on past practice is unlikely to provide an adequate and consistent basis for
organizational sentencing reform" because of the "relatively small number
of organizational prosecutions. ' ' 3
But corporate crime does occur at least occasionally. Agency theory can
provide some insights into when such behavior is likely to take place. At the
outset, it should be noted that deviations between the interests of managers
and the interests of shareholders are likely to increase as the size of a firm's
shareholding population goes up. 4 As the number of shareholders grows,
the benefits to individual monitoring decline. Two shareholders who own
fifty percent each of a firm's stock are likely to do substantially more moni-
toring than 50,000 shareholders who own only a minute fraction of a firm's
stock. Each of the two fifty-percent shareholders will capture one-half of the
gains from their monitoring activities. Each of the 50,000 shareholders will
capture only an infinitesimal fraction of any gains associated with
monitoring.
The amount of organizational crime will also decline as the size of a firm
increases. This accords with the basic principles of agency theory discussed
above. Managers of large, widely-held firms will not be monitored as assidu-
ously as those in smaller, closely-held firms. The managers of these widely-
held firms, therefore, have more latitude to give expression to their prefer-
ence for avoiding risk. One way such managers can avoid risk is by
refraining from engaging in criminal conduct.
In contrast, managers in smaller firms are more likely to engage in crimi-
nal activities than managers in larger firms because they are able to capture a
larger share of any gains garnered by such activities. Managers of corpora-
tions bear a disproportionate share of the risks associated with criminal con-
duct because it is they, and not the outside shareholders, who will go to jail,
or at least suffer stigma, if authorities discover the illegal conduct. But these
managers must share the proceeds of their activities with the shareholders.
In the case of a large firm with a widely dispersed shareholding population,
the small share of the gains from a criminal enterprise that a manager keeps
will rarely compensate the manager for the personal risks he incurs by
engaging in a criminal enterprise for his firm.
Consistent with the implications of agency theory, of the 1,283 corpora-
tions convicted of federal crimes during the four-year period between 1984
and 1987, "only about 10 percent crossed the threshold of $1 million in sales
32 Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Study of Social Harm and Sentencing
Practice in the Federal Courts, 1984-1987, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 605, 606 (1989).
31 Parker, supra note 23, at 516.
31 More precisely, monitoring is likely to decline as the number of people owning large
percentages of a firm's shares declines. Since the ownership stakes in larger firms is
highly disaggregated, the statement in the text is generally correct.
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and 50 employees; less than 3 percent had traded stock." Thus, small firms
comprise the vast majority of the firms engaged in criminal activity. More-
over, it would be wrong to suggest that these statistics are misleading
because there are more small firms than large firms. The very size and scope
of the activities of larger firms permits ample opportunity for them to engage
in criminal activities. Large corporations engage in transactions at many
levels and in many markets. Lower- and middle-level managers have ample
independence, and ample opportunity to engage in criminal conduct. Signif-
icantly, however, there is little evidence that they actually do so. Consistent
with an agency cost approach to corporate crime, the data suggests that
managers of smaller firms, who are more closely monitored, and who are in
a position to capture a large share of the gains associated with criminal con-
duct, are more likely to engage in criminal conduct.
C. The Self-Interest Assumption
The fact remains, however, that even the largest corporations are, on
occasion, subject to criminal prosecutions. In 1990, General Electric Com-
pany was convicted of defrauding the government of $10 million for a battle-
field computer system.a Boeing, Inc., pleaded guilty in November, 1988 to
illegally obtaining two secret Pentagon documents,' and in February, 1990,
RCA pleaded guilty to illegally obtaining secret budget defense reports.as
This section of the Article will attempt to reconcile the insights of agency
theory with the reality of criminal misconduct in very large corporations. It
may simply be the case that some managers have a positive taste for risk, or
enjoy engaging in criminal activities. While it appears uncontrovertible that
most managers are risk averse, tastes vary widely among individuals, and it
is at least plausible that some small fraction of corporate managers genuinely
prefers criminal conduct. This explanation, however, does not adequately
account for criminal behavior by large organizations, because it fails to
explain why managers of large firms engage in criminal activities on behalf
of their firms instead of on their own behalf. After all, if a corporate man-
ager is going to steal, why should he steal for his shareholders and not for
himself?
Judge Posner has suggested another possible explanation for corporate
crime. He has observed that if shareholders "bear no responsibility for a
manager's crime, they will have every incentive to hire managers willing to
commit crimes on the corporation's behalf."' In other words, even if only a
35 Cohen, Ho, Jones & Schleich, Organizations as Defendants in Federal Court: A
Preliminary Analysis of Prosecutions, Convictions and Sanctions, 1984-1987, 10 WHI-TIER
L. REV. 103, 112 (1988).
1 Sugawara, Criminal Indictments, Training Bigger Guns on Corporations, Wash.
Post, Mar. 2, 1990, at Al, col. 2.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 POSNER, supra note 31, at 398.
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small fraction of the population of potential corporate managers consists of
risk-preferring people willing to commit organizational crimes on the share-
holders' behalf, shareholders will seek these people out and hire them. It is
not clear, however, how shareholders will be able to identify managers with
a predisposition for engaging in criminal acts. In addition, in the large, pub-
licly held firm, most managers who are in a position to commit crimes are
hired by other managers, not by the shareholders, or even the firm's board of
directors. Put another way, the agency cost/risk aversion argument
presented here applies not only to corporate decision-makers themselves, but
also to those people who select the corporate decision-makers. In large, pub-
licly held corporations, it seems highly implausible that managers are
selected on the basis of their willingness to engage in criminal activity.
But even if we assume that Judge Posner is correct, and that shareholders
do in fact select managers with a proclivity to engage in corporate crime, the
case for imposing criminal sanctions on the corporation-as distinct from
individual shareholders-is an uneasy one. Surely no one believes that all of
the shareholders in a publicly held firm are equally culpable for the hiring
decisions of the firm. Rather, it is far more likely that a single dominant
shareholder or a small group of block holders would dominate a firm's deci-
sion to hire a crooked manager. Thus, even in those rare situations to which
Posner's model of devious shareholders selecting criminal managers applies,
the appropriate remedy would be to pierce the corporate veil and impose
sanctions on those shareholders responsible for the hiring decisions. To
impose blanket criminal liability on the firm as a whole would punish inno-
cent shareholders for the misdeeds of their fellow shareholders.
But corporate crime does occur, even though financial and economic the-
ory does not explain why. There are at least three plausible explanations for
why at least some managers will engage in criminal activities on behalf of
their firms. First, it may be the case that managers are forced to engage in
illegal behavior simply in order to keep their firm or their division afloat. As
will be seen, even firms that are not on the verge of bankruptcy may find
themselves in a situation in which criminal activity is necessary for survival.
Second, the corporate culture in a particular industry may promote criminal
conduct. That is, it may be the case that engaging in a particular course of
conduct, though illegal, is standard practice in an industry. Under these
circumstances, managers who engage in criminal conduct may believe the
conduct is not illegal, or may believe they will not be prosecuted if caught.
And, where illegal activity represents a corporate norm, criminal behavior
will not have a stigmatizing effect on a manager, at least within the industry
itself. Finally, corporations may run afoul of the criminal laws because the
firm's key actors simply make a mistake. The corporation may miscalculate
the legality of a particular activity, or the likelihood of criminal prosecution
once government officials discover the activity. A changing political climate
can transform a seemingly benign act into a criminal event.
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1. Criminal Activity, Managerial Shirking, and the Risk of Insolvency
While corporate management may be risk averse during the normal
course of business, the normal incentive structure of these managers may
change radically when their firm is on the verge of bankruptcy. Once again,
the managers' own investment in firm-specific skills greatly affects the analy-
sis. Since, by definition, managers cannot transfer their firm-specific skills to
other firms, the managers lose their investment in these skills if their firm
goes under. Moreover, high-level managers have a difficult time securing
comparable positions at other firms.' Thus managers of firms on the brink
of insolvency have a strong incentive to take great risks to protect these firm-
specific investments.
In addition to their loss of firm-specific human capital investments, man-
agers of insolvent firms may suffer stigma in the job market. Even managers
who are in no way responsible for the firm's insolvency may be stigmatized if
their firm becomes insolvent. Potential employers may simply assume that
managers of insolvent firms are inept. Because of the costs associated with
acquiring and analyzing information about individual workers, potential
employers may find it efficient to invoke this assumption as a crude rule of
thumb in order to economize on information costs.
All this gives managers of firms on the brink of insolvency strong incen-
tives to take great risks to avoid insolvency. For these reasons, managers
may be inclined to engage in criminal activities such as bribing government
officials, price fixing, or defrauding consumers, in an effort to increase corpo-
rate revenues.
While managers' efforts to avoid bankruptcy by taking huge risks may
benefit shareholders, often they do not. A conflict between managers' and
shareholders' interests arises in these circumstances. If a firm goes bank-
rupt, managers often lose their jobs. On the other hand, shareholders in
firms that undergo a bankruptcy reorganization often receive securities that
will have value if the reorganized firm is successful. In contrast, firms con-
victed of a crime can lose their entire net worth. In particular, firms con-
victed of government procurement fraud or program fraud may lose their
ability to obtain government contracts. A recent study showed that 6.6% of
all corporate offenders were formally disbarred or suspended from doing
business with the government. 41 Indeed, there is evidence that firms con-
victed of defrauding the government may lose their ability to do business
with the government even when their sanctions do not contain a penalty of
formal suspension or disbarment. Thus, the 6.6% figure probably underesti-
mates the percentage of convicted firms facing government disbarment.42
40 Indeed, it is a truism at firms specializing in corporate relocations that the higher a
manager's salary, the more time the manager needs to find another job. The rule of
thumb is that finding a new job takes one additional month for each additional $10,000
increment in salary previously earned by a manager.
41 Cohen, supra note 32, at 613-14.
4 Id.
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Criminal conduct by organizations on the verge of bankruptcy is a likely a
manifestation of this divergence of interests between managers and share-
holders, rather than an example of corporate anti-social behavior undertaken
in the shareholders' interests. Similarly, when managerial ineptitude causes
a firm to perform poorly, the firm's managers may engage in criminal activ-
ity to compensate for a poor level of performance and to avoid being dis-
placed. This type of behavior also contravenes shareholders' interests
because the shareholders would prefer to obtain good corporate performance
through legal means, since there is less risk associated with legal earnings
than with illegal earnings.
Thus, managers who engage in criminal conduct do not necessarily act in
the best interests of their shareholders. Illegal conduct exposes shareholders
to risks that shareholders would prefer to avoid and for which they receive
no compensation. Self-interested managers will engage in criminal conduct
on behalf of their organizations not to benefit shareholders, but instead to
retain their jobs.
Managers of firms faced with the prospect of a hostile takeover face incen-
tives similar to those in firms on the brink of insolvency. Because successful
hostile takeovers generally result in a turnover of the target firm's top man-
agement, target firm managers have incentives to resist takeovers-even
those that are in the best interests of the shareholders. Indeed, commenta-
tors have criticized devices such as poison pills, designed to discourage hos-
tile takeovers, as vehicles that simply transfer wealth from corporate
shareholders to corporate managers.43
But the most effective way for a firm to avoid a hostile takeover is to show
consistently high earnings. High earnings increase the cost of a firm's
shares, in turn, driving up the acquisition cost to outside bidders. Conceiva-
bly, managers will cause their firms to engage in illegal activities in order to
increase earnings and discourage outside bidders. This explanation for ille-
gal corporate conduct is implausible, however, for three reasons. First, there
are legal anti-takeover devices that can effectively deter hostile bidders, or
force them to negotiate with incumbent management. In particular, corpo-
rate boards of directors can, without shareholder approval, adopt the poison
pill, a device that provides target shareholders with a warrant that entitles
them to obtain a premium for their shares from the acquiring firm. In addi-
tion, various states, particularly Pennsylvania, have enacted tough anti-take-
over measures that make it extremely difficult for a corporation to be
acquired without the incumbent management's approval. 44
Second, golden parachute contracts, which guarantee generous severance
41 Easterbrook & Jarrell, Do Targets Gain from Defeating Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 277 (1984) (offering empirical evidence tending to show that target firm
shareholders suffer losses when tender offers are defeated). But see Jensen & Ruback,
The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983)
(offering evidence that target firm shareholders benefit from takeovers).
"4 See, e.g., 70 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-85 (Purdon 1991).
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pay for managers of firms taken over by outside bidders, reduce managers'
incentives to engage in illegal conduct as a means of avoiding their ouster in
a hostile takeover. Indeed, golden parachutes generally reduce the incen-
tives of managers to resist takeovers by any means, including illegal activi-
ties. Thus, in light of the presence of low-cost, legal alternatives to engaging
in corporate crime, it is unlikely that any corporate manager would find it in
his interest to resort to crime to avoid a takeover.
Finally, the incentive that outside bidders have to monitor the target
firm's illegal activities further explains why managers will not resort to ille-
gal activities to avoid hostile takeovers. An outside bidder who discovers
that a firm is propping up its earnings through illegal activities has every
incentive to publicize those activities. The resulting publicity will drive
down the price of the target firm's shares and lower the acquisition cost to
the outside bidder. Thus, target firms are not likely to succeed at using ille-
gal means to avoid takeover since discovery virtually guarantees a transfer of
control.
This aspect of the agency cost perspective suggests still another explana-
tion for corporate crime: managerial shirking. Corporate managers may
recognize that they will be displaced through discharge or ouster in a hostile
takeover unless they keep their firms' earnings at or above a particular
level.4" Managers may accomplish their goal of "satisficing" or maintaining
a particular level of earnings' either by hard work and competence, or by
engaging in criminal activity. Even a risk-averse manager will engage in
criminal activity if, in his view, the risks associated with criminal activity are
less than the risks associated with not engaging in criminal activity and per-
forming so poorly that he loses his job. Thus, the threat of sub-optimal per-
formance can cause managers to become risk preferrers. Put another way,
managers' criminal activity may operate as a substitute for diligent manage-
rial performance undertaken in the shareholders' interest. Under these cir-
45 For a discussion of satisficing to avoid hostile takeover, see Brown, In Defense of
Management Buyouts, 65 TUL. L. REV. 57, 72-73 (1990).
4 Satisficing has been defined as the desire to "seek choices that satisfy at least
minimum levels of aspiration with respect to their several objectives." F. SCHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 34 (2d ed. 1980); see
also Simon, Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science, 49 AM.
ECON. REV. 253, 262-65 (1959).
Satisficing to avoid hostile takeover is possible so long as there are positive transactions
costs associated with takeovers. See Brown, supra note 45, at 73 n.45. The massive
federal and state regulatory apparatus governing hostile acquisitions has raised the costs
of launching a hostile takeover considerably. See Fischel, Efficient Capital Market
Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57
TEX. L. REV. 1 (1978); Macey & Netter, Regulation 13D and the Regulatory Process, 65
WASH. U.L.Q. 131 (1987). These regulatory costs thereby increase the efficacy of
satisficing by corporate management by providing incumbent management with a wider
range of latitude in which to operate without fear of market discipline in the form of a
hostile takeover.
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cumstances, organizational crime represents a form of shirking because
managers self-interestedly expose shareholders to increased risks. Not only
does this type of criminal activity expose shareholders to the normal risks of
failure, it also exposes them to the costs of criminal sanctions.
Similarly, a link between criminal activity and insolvency exists where
criminal activity is essential to the survival of an otherwise healthy firm. As
discussed above, firms on the brink of insolvency have an incentive to act
illegally. In addition, for some firms, illegal activity becomes necessary
because it represents an industry norm. The liquor industry during prohibi-
tion and the illegal drug trade today are paradigmatic examples of industries
in which illegal activities are the norm. Firms engaged in these businesses
must resort to illegal conduct to survive. Similarly, firms that do business in
certain countries may find that they can enter markets in those countries
only if they make illegal payments to certain officials. Where access to a
particular market is essential to a firm's survival, it is in managers' interest to
make these payments despite their illegality.
Similarly, as capital markets become more efficient, securities firms may
be unable to maintain profitability unless they engage in insider trading.
Finally, managers of firms that bid for government contracts may feel com-
pelled to engage in illegal activities either to obtain critical information nec-
essary for bidding, or to make corporate planning decisions based on
complete information.
The point is not that illegal corporate activity undertaken to avoid insol-
vency is acceptable, but rather that it may be understandable. The structure
of the agency relationship within a firm powerfully deters management from
acting illegally. On the other hand, the threat of bankruptcy, which could
deprive corporate managers of their investments in firm-specific human capi-
tal, and may stigmatize them in the managerial labor market, explains this
seemingly irrational behavior.
2. Criminal Activity and Corporate Culture
Even in the most competitive markets, firms' behavior is often highly imi-
tative. Because only the fittest firms survive in a market economy, firms
presumably act efficiently. Firms faced with considerable cost and uncer-
tainty in formulating strategies act rationally by imitating the observed
behavior of other, similarly situated firms. Imitation, however, can send
false signals to corporate managers. That an industry commonly follows a
particular custom or practice may suggest to corporate managers that the
activity is legally acceptable even if it is not. Even when managers know
that a particular practice violates the law, corporate executives may con-
clude that authorities have chosen to overlook the practice if it falls within
certain bounds. For example, many drivers believe that authorities will not
issue speeding tickets to motorists who exceed the 55 mile-per-hour speed
limit by only one or two miles-per-hour. Drivers know that it is illegal to
travel 57 miles-per-hour in a 55 mile-per-hour speed zone, but they believe
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that authorities will not enforce the speeding laws within this range.
Although this general belief stems from drivers' observation of the behavior
of other drivers, rather than any official announcement by enforcement offi-
cials, drivers appear to be confident that they will not be sanctioned for
exceeding the speed limit by a certain amount.
Similarly, even risk-averse managers may engage in illegal activity if their
observation of rival firms' behavior leads them to conclude that there is vir-
tually no risk that authorities will prosecute them. In addition, corporate
managers may conclude that, even if authorities discover and punish their
conduct, they will not be stigmatized in the managerial labor market for
following an industry norm.
3. Organizational Crime and Mistake
A final explanation for corporate criminal conduct is mistake: where cor-
porate officers and directors engage in an activity that they believe is legal,
but that is in fact illegal. For example, during the seventies, Securities and
Exchange Commission investigations into unreported corporate earnings
revealed that over 450 firms had covered up the payment of illegal gratuities
in foreign or domestic business transactions.4 7 The information uncovered
in these SEC investigations led to the passage in 1977 of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, which made certain types of corporate payments illegal and
required public companies to keep sufficiently accurate books and records to
reveal the nature of all such payments.4 8 While it appears that many of these
payments were illegal before the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act,4 9 it also appears that the firms making these payments were unaware of
their illegality.
50
Corporate managers are probably likely to make mistakes about the legal-
ity of a particular corporate act only for crimes of a highly technical nature.
By contrast, corporate managers will probably not mistakenly believe that
price fixing is permissible. The hopelessly complex regulatory environment
in which the modern corporation must operate, however, creates plenty of
opportunity for individual criminal acts. Nevertheless, we should expect
corporate officers and directors to comply with certain laws, such as prohibi-
tions on hazardous emissions and toxic wastes, or laws relating to worker
safety, despite their technicality.
There are some regulatory areas, most notably those involving the federal
securities laws, in which a mistaken impression that one's conduct is legal
can lead to criminal sanctions. Attorneys who specialize in securities regula-
tion have noted that the recent insider trading scandals have led to "the
47 j. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 449 (1982).
48 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4121 (mandating detailed record-keeping for securities).
49 See Pitt & Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead at the Next
Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 195 (1990).
50 Id.
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criminalization of things that up to now have been viewed as technical viola-
tions of the securities laws, such as 'net capital violations, Section 13(d) vio-
lations, parking . . . [and] books and records.' ,51 The dramatically
heightened emphasis on pursuing criminal sanctions for violating the laws
against insider trading marks this trend. Throughout much of the eighties,
authorities and legal experts doubted whether the SEC had the statutory
authority to impose even civil sanctions, beyond mere injunctive relief
against future violations, for insider trading. 2 For example, when the SEC
brought civil charges against Raymond Dirks for allegedly acting as a "tip-
per" to some of his investment banking clients,' the Justice Department
affirmatively opposed the SEC's position. As two distinguished securities
lawyers observed, it was not surprising that the Supreme Court sided with
the Justice Department, since, after all, "[i]f the Justice Department could
not agree with the SEC on what the laws against insider trading covered,
how could Mr. Dirks be expected to comply with those laws?"'
Because managers are likely to be more risk averse than shareholders dur-
ing the normal course of corporate life, the managers are likely to be
extremely cautious to avoid the possibility of mistakenly violating some
criminal law. Excessive risk avoidance, however, imposes costs on share-
holders in the form of decreased innovation, excessive internal controls, and
increased reliance on outside counsel at all levels of corporate decision-mak-
ing. In addition, the probability of criminal prosecutions for purely political
reasons also increases managers' proclivities toward risk-aversion. The
recent criminal indictment of Exxon in connection with the Valdez oil spill
provides an example. In Connection with the indictment, Attorney General
Richard Thornburgh held a press conference to say that pursuing criminal
charges would send a "'strong signal that environmental crimes will not be
tolerated.' "' Exxon was indicted under the Dangerous Cargo Act5 and
the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 7 which, respectively, regulate the
transportation of dangerous materials and mandate that ships hire compe-
tent crews.' Exxon was also indicted under the Migratory Birds Treaty
51 Insider Trading, Internationalization, Rule '144A 'Discussed at ABA Conference, 19
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1242-43 (Aug. 14, 1987).
52 Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 49, at 202-03.
51 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
4 Pitt & Shapiro, supra, note 49, at 218 n. 298.
" Another Political Prosecution?, Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1990, at A14, col. 1 [hereinafter
Another Political Prosecution].
5 46 U.S.C. § 170 (1958).
57 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227, 1229, 1232(a) (1986).
58 Another Political Prosecution, supra note 55.
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Act 9 for killing migratory birds, and the Refuse Act' for discharging and
depositing refuse matter without a permit.61
The indictment has been called "a political case to please the environmen-
talists." 2 Whatever the merits of the various counts in the indictment, the
message to other firms is strong. Corporate management, in an effort to
avoid the taint of a criminal indictment, may be far less willing to engage in
the level of risk-taking that shareholders or society would prefer.
4. The Interplay of the Factors Leading to Corporate Criminal
Conduct
Each of the three factors detailed above-insolvency, corporate culture
and mistake-can lead even rationally self-interested corporate executives to
commit crimes on behalf of their firms. In some cases, all three factors can
work together to create a situation in which corporate managers will find it
in their interest to engage in corporate crime. For example, a particular
illegal activity may become the norm in an industry because firms find it
impossible to survive in that industry without engaging in the illegal activity.
The defense procurement industry, widely thought to be fraught with
criminal activity, is a case in point. The recent convictions of General Elec-
tric, Boeing, and RCA, for example, all involved allegations of illegal activi-
ties in connection with these firms' involvement in the defense industry.63
Despite the huge size of the firms involved in the defense industry, the pros-
pects of bankruptcy are far from trivial for these firms because of the risks
involved in the industry itself. For such firms, one or two successful con-
tract awards can make the difference between astounding success and dismal
failure. Unlike most other firms, the range of possible outcomes for firms in
the defense business are extreme: firms are likely to be either very successful
or very unsuccessful. Under the analysis developed above, such firms are
particularly likely to engage in illegal activities because of the high stakes
involved.
In addition, for a long time, there was little if any scrutiny of defense
contracting activities." During the past seven years, twenty of the 100 larg-
est defense contractors have been convicted of defense procurement viola-
tions.' This high conviction rate contrasts sharply with the four decades
prior to 1983, when not a single major defense contractor was convicted of
any procurement violation.'
These data are consistent with the discussion of corporate culture above.
59 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-708, 709a-711 (1985).
60 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1986).
61 Another Political Prosecution, supra note 55.
62 Id.
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Although there is no reason to believe that managers today have a greater
incentive to engage in defense procurement fraud than they had in the past,
67
the unlikelihood of convictions for corporate fraud before 1983 created a
corporate culture in which managers simply presumed that certain activities,
though illegal, were de facto permissible.
Finally, because the defense procurement business is fraught with techni-
calities, the possibilities for mistakes and for technical violations of the law
are great:
defense contractors have to worry about conflict of interest laws when
they hire employees, whether the marketing documents are illegal,
whether cost estimates are accurate, whether testing is done according
to government directions and what their relationships are with govern-
ment officials.es
Thus, the greater risks of insolvency in the industry, the corporate culture,
and the likelihood of management mistake operate to overcome corporate
managements' normal risk aversion, and induce legal violations.
D. Corporate Criminality and Shareholder Welfare
A prominent commentator has observed that "[a] distinctive feature of
organizational crime is that it is committed by agents for the primary benefit
of a principal." '69 The analysis presented above casts considerable doubt on
the conventional assumption that corporate shareholders inevitably benefit
from corporate crime. The conventional assumption, embraced by virtually
all legal scholars including those with an understanding of economic the-
ory,70 is inconsistent with the basic assumption that corporate managers, like
other economic actors, are rational, self-interested individuals. As such,
their incentives often diverge from those of their principals.
While executive compensation plans that include stock options, bonuses,
and opportunities for advancement serve to align the interests of managers
and shareholders, such devices are costly. It is simply not efficient for firms
to go to the expense of bringing the interests of managers and shareholders
into perfect alignment. In fact, managers of large, publicly held firms may
be more risk averse than shareholders would prefer. If the societal savings
67 Of course it is not possible to rule out completely the possibility that in fact there
has been an increase in corporate crime in the defense procurement industry.
Conceivably, the increasing federal budget deficit, coupled with a widespread perception
that the government should cut its defense budget because of diminishing Cold War
tensions, has signalled to firms in the defense industry that there is likely to be a major
contraction in the amount of business available. If so, the increased criminal activity is
consistent with the prediction made here that organizational crime will increase as the
threat of bankruptcy increases.
68 Sugawara, supra note 36.
69 Coffee, Corporate Crime and Punishment, A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of
Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 419, 456 (1980).
70 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 31, at 397-99.
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from reducing some corporate crime, such as procurement fraud or price
fixing, is less than the cost to society of effectuating the reduction, it is hardly
worthwhile to expend the resources necessary to achieve the reduction.
While it is true that shareholders may benefit ex post if the criminal activ-
ity of their managers goes undetected, it is not at all clear that shareholders
necessarily benefit ex ante. While shareholders can spread the firm-specific
risk associated with the investments they make in particular firms, managers
cannot. In fact, shareholders may prefer managers to take certain business
risks. If those risks generate high returns, the shareholders reap the benefits.
If the risks lead to catastrophe, the losses to diversified shareholders may be
offset by gains in other securities. When managers substitute corporate
crime for diligent, honest performance in order to obtain sufficient earnings
to avoid their own displacement, however, shareholders will be worse off
even if the conduct goes undetected, because the conduct exposes sharehold-
ers to risks for which they receive no compensation. This explanation of the
managerial incentive to engage in organizational crime stands in sharp con-
trast to the standard explanations in which managers are assumed to be per-
fect agents of their shareholders and engage in corporate crime only on the
shareholders' behalf.
Just as corporate managers may be more risk averse than shareholders
during the normal course of corporate life, they may be more risk-preferring
than shareholders during the waning days of corporate existence, because
they have so much more to lose. As discussed above,7' shareholders may
prefer to allow a firm to undergo a bankruptcy reorganization rather than to
engage in criminal activity to avoid such a reorganization, while managers
might prefer to have the firm engage in criminal acts to avoid insolvency.
Shareholders, unlike managers, may be able to recoup some of their losses in
a successful reorganization, while the managers stand to lose everything,
including their jobs and their reputations as good managers.7 2
Similarly, in large, multi-faceted firms in which criminal activity is iso-
lated in a particular division or subsidiary, the managers of those divisions or
subsidiaries may engage in illegal activities in order to avoid being dis-
charged for poor performance. The firm's shareholders and high-level man-
agers would prefer the employees to refrain from engaging in illegal conduct,
but the costs of detecting the conduct may be greater than the benefits to
shareholders, managers, or society. Once again, the point is not that share-
holders never benefit from corporate crime, even from an ex ante perspec-
tive. Rather, they do not necessarily benefit from the criminal actions that
corporate managers undertake on their behalf.
The previous section of this article identified three situations in which
even managers of large, publicly held firms may engage in criminal conduct.
In addition to committing crimes when their firm is on the verge on insol-
71 See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
72 Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20 J.
LEGAL STUD. 277 (1991).
[Vol. 71:315
HeinOnline -- 71 B.U. L. Rev. 334 1991
CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF ORGANIZATIONS
vency, managers may also engage in illegal acts when doing so is the norm in
a particular industry, or when managers erroneously think that a particular
practice is legal. The above discussion presented the argument that engaging
in criminal conduct when a firm is on the brink of insolvency may not benefit
shareholders. The same holds true when the criminal conduct is a result of
mistake or a function of the corporate culture in a particular industry.
To see why this is so, we need to examine the assumptions about how
shareholders gain from organizational crime. It is generally presumed that
firms engage in organizational crime in order to provide shareholders with
abnormally high returns.7" That is, taking into account the possibility of
detection and punishment, illegal activities supposedly provide firms with
rates of return in excess of those that the firms would obtain under normal,
competitive market conditions. By raising the penalties for organizational
crime, or by increasing the probability of detection, presumably the inci-
dence of organizational crime will decline because firms will no longer stand
to gain from such conduct.
But the analysis here, which suggests that firms sometimes engage in ille-
gal activity because it is the norm in the industry, or because of mistake on
the part of corporate managers, indicates that shareholders do not stand to
earn abnormal returns from corporate criminal conduct. When a particular
criminal activity, such as paying bribes to government officials, is the norm
in a certain industry, any abnormal returns will be competed away by other
firms. Thus, shareholders will not benefit in any meaningful sense from this
sort of activity.
It is also unlikely that criminal activity due to mistake will produce abnor-
mal returns for shareholders. The probability of detection is high for crimes
committed as a result of mistake because officers and directors will not ordi-
narily attempt to cover-up this sort of illegal activity because they do not
think it is illegal. When the mistake is committed because corporate officers
imitate the behavior of other firms, the likelihood of shareholders earning
abnormal returns becomes even more remote because, as seen above, any
gains will be competed away by the various firms. When, as in the case of
mistake, the probability of detection is quite high, it is improbable that firms
will earn abnormal rates of return from such activities.
Thus, it is not at all clear that shareholders benefit from corporate crime.
Sometimes, as in the bankruptcy context, when managers take risks that are
excessive from the shareholders' point of view, corporate crime will conflict
directly with shareholder interests. At other times, as in the corporate cul-
ture and mistake examples, there is no evidence that crime permits share-
holders to earn abnormal returns. Indeed, in the case of the corporate
culture example, there is no reason to believe that shareholders will earn
abnormal returns even if the activity goes undetected.
In this regard, even in the unlikely event that shareholders manage to
13 The term "abnormal returns" refers to returns to investors exceeding the amount
necessary to compensate them for the risks associated with the firm's activities.
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attract managers willing to engage in criminal activities on their behalf, there
is no reason to believe that shareholders will benefit from the managers'
criminal acts because shareholders will have to compensate their managers
for the expected costs of punishment. 4 Thus, the gains that shareholders
might receive from employing managers willing to engage in corporate
crimes are likely to be returned to managers in the form of higher
compensation.
Finally, in assessing the efficacy of imposing organizational sanctions on
firms engaging in misconduct, it is important to recognize that such organi-
zational sanctions will not necessarily lead to increased deterrence. The Sen-
tencing Commission, however, has described deterrence as the main purpose
of punishing corporations.75 In particular, the Commission observed that
organizational sanctions would provide a "strong incentive for owners and
managers of organizations to strengthen internal mechanisms for preventing
officers and employees from committing crimes and for detecting and pun-
ishing such crimes that are committed."'7 But when illegal behavior is the
norm, or when a firm erroneously believes that a particular venture is legal,
it is unlikely that internal monitoring and enforcement mechanisms will
decrease the incidence of corporate crime.
In the bankruptcy context, internal control mechanisms may serve the
intended purpose of deterring corporate crime. But it is also likely that the
internal monitors in a firm on the verge of insolvency will find their incen-
tives closely aligned with the parties whom they are supposed to monitor.
After all, the monitors of insolvent firms will find themselves just as unem-
ployed as the people they .are monitoring.
E. Agency Costs as a Source of Criminal Law
The agency cost perspective also suggests another major insight: agency
costs may lead, under certain circumstances, to developments in the criminal
law itself. That is, often it may not be in a shareholder's best interest to have
a particular corporate activity declared illegal. But a divergence of interests
between a firm's managers and its shareholders may lead management to
lobby to have a particular activity declared illegal even though that activity
is in the best interests of the firm's shareholders.
The pursuit of criminal prosecutions for stock parking provides an exam-
ple. Stock parking involves the practice of placing one's stock holdings in
the hands of other firms in order to conceal the full extent of one's holdings.
The securities laws make it illegal for shareholders to accumulate more than
five percent of a public company's stock without publicly disclosing their
identity and motives to the SEC.77
74 POSNER, supra note 31, at 398.
75 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZATIONAL
DEFENDANTS (preliminary draft, Nov. 1989).
76 Id.
77 See Wellman v. Dickenson, 682 F.2d 355, 363-67 (2d Cir. 1982).
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These provisions also include disclosure requirements under which bid-
ding shareholders must reveal any valuable information that they discover
about the target firm when the target firm's share price does not reflect that
information. For example, a bidding firm may discover that a particular
target firm is not taking full advantage of a certain asset, or that its overhead
is too high, or that its management is inept.
By forcing bidding firms to disclose this information, the securities laws
deter hostile bids for target companies by raising the cost of making such
bids. Stock parking is the principal means by which bidding firms attempt to
evade the reach of these disclosure provisions. By parking stock in friendly
hands, bidding firms can make it appear that they own or control less stock
than they actually do, thereby delaying the applicability of the disclosure
obligation.
These disclosure rules benefit target firm management by making hostile
takeovers less likely. On the other hand, the rules harm target firm share-
holders by making it less likely that shareholders will be able to sell their
shares at a premium to an outside bidder. In short, strict enforcement of the
laws against stock parking benefit target-firm management but harm target-
firm shareholders. Thus corporate managers who put political pressure on
Congress and the SEC to encourage criminal sanctions against bidders
engaged in stock parking do not act in the best interests of their sharehold-
ers. Instead, these corporate managers act to benefit themselves at the
expense of their shareholders.78 In other words, corporate criminal law
itself, responding to management pressure to increase criminal penalties for
stock parking and other laws that make takeovers more difficult, reflects the
divergence in the agency relationship.
II. AGENCY THEORY AND OPTIMAL PENALTY THEORY
Risk aversion plays a key role in the discussion of corporate crime above.
The preceding section demonstrates, through the concept of risk aversion,
that corporate managers often engage in corporate crime for self-interested
reasons. When this is so, corporate criminal acts, though beneficial to a firm
ex post if they go undetected, are harmful to shareholders ex ante.
Risk aversion also plays a key role in the economic analysis of optimal
penalties for criminal acts. Optimal penalty theory begins with the basic
observation that the penalty for a crime represents the social loss created by
the offense adjusted to reflect the probability that the offender will escape
detection. Suppose, for example, that a particular crime involves total social
costs of $1000. If the probability of detection is 100%, the offender will bear
the total social costs of his crime if the penalty is set at $1000. If the
probability of detection is only ten percent, the fine must be set at $10,000.
78 See Bilzerian Sentenced, Parole Called 'Unlikely', NAT'L L.J., Oct. 9, 1989, at 6
(Bilzerian sentenced to six concurrent four-year jail terms and fined $1.5 million for
parking stock).
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If the probability of detection is one in 1000, the fine should be $1,000,000. 79
Each of these penalty schemes leads to an expected penalty, or certainty
equivalent, of $1000.'
If the costs of collecting fines are positive, but do not vary with the
amount of the fine, the most efficient criminal sanction would impose
extremely high fines, and would not concern itself with devoting large
amounts of resources to detection in order to raise the probability of detec-
tion. Put another way, if we can achieve the optimal deterrence of crime by
imposing any of a variety of penalties, we should select the enforcement
scheme that imposes the lowest administrative cost. Because increasing the
probability of detecting criminals is costly, the optimal deterrence scheme
may involve keeping the probability of detection low and the penalties
high.' I . .
It is important to note that the preceding analysis applies only when the
population of potential criminals is risk-neutral. While an assumption of
risk-neutrality applies to corporate shareholders, who can diversify their
investments, the assumption does not readily apply to corporate officers and
directors, who are risk averse because they are unable to diversify their firm-
specific human capital investments.8 2
When the relevant corporate decision-makers are risk averse, however, the
analysis of optimal penalties changes dramatically. The relevant decision-
makers, at least in the large, publicly-held corporation, are not the firm's
shareholders, but its officers and directors. And when corporate managers
are risk averse, they will refrain from engaging in criminal activity under the
threat of stiff penalties even when the benefits of the activity are greater than
the certainty equivalent of the fine. In such circumstances,
an increase in the fine will not be a costless transfer payment .... [F]or
criminals who are risk averse, every reduction in the probability of
apprehension and conviction, and corresponding increase in the fine for
those who are apprehended and convicted, imposes a disutility not
translated into revenue by the state. Thus the real social costs of fines
increases for risk averse criminals as the fine increases.8 3
Because apprehension for criminal offenses inevitably imposes costs on
corporate decision-makers and on corporate shareholders, raising the penal-
ties for corporate crime can involve real social costs from the perspective of
shareholders and society, because high penalties lead managers to be exces-
79 POSNER, supra note 31, at 207.
80 If the probability of detection is 100%, setting the penalty at $1000 produces an
expected fine of $1000 because 1000 X 1 = 1000. If the probability of detection is 10%,
setting the fine at $10,000 produces an expected penalty of $1000 because 10,000 X. 1 =
1000. If the probability of detection is only one in 1000, setting the fine at $1,000,000
produces an expected penalty of $1000 because 1,000,000 X .001 = 1000.
81 A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 76 (1983).
82 See supra text accompanying note 26.
83 Posner, supra note 31, at 207-08.
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sively risk averse. In other words, the agency cost approach to corporate
sanctions suggests that it is inappropriate to base corporate fines on the
assumption that corporations are risk neutral, and that, for that reason, we
should impose stiff fines. Instead, increasing the penalties for corporate
crime leads to a net reduction in social welfare because corporate managers
will refrain from engaging in activities even when the expected benefits out-
weigh the expected societal costs.
Previous attempts to apply optimal penalty theory to corporate crime,
even by sophisticated commentators, have assumed that it is appropriate to
treat organizations as risk neutral.' But this assumption holds true only
when interests between managers and shareholders do not diverge. In fact,
it seems clear that managers will be significantly more risk averse than share-
holders. We should formulate organizational sanctions with this fact in
mind.
CONCLUSION
This Article has applied an agency cost perspective to the subject of cor-
porate crime. In this context, agency costs refer to the divergence of inter-
ests between corporate managers and shareholders, an inevitable
consequence of the separation of ownership and management within the
large, publicly held corporation. This divergence of interests manifests itself
in the form of corporate officers' and directors' excessive risk aversion.
The agency cost approach to corporate crime taken in this Article sug-
gests that the problem of corporate crime may not be as significant as popu-
larly believed. The divergence of interest between shareholders and
managers in terms of their relative proclivities for bearing risk creates a nat-
ural impediment to corporate crime. The data seem consistent with this
implication. As one commentator has observed, "perhaps the most striking
fact emerging from the data [on corporate crime] is the small volume of
organizational prosecutions." Thus, that corporate crime exists at all is
rather surprising when we recognize that corporate crime appears to impose
costs on corporate decisionmakers out of proportion to its potential benefits.
The benefits of corporate crime, in any event, accrue mainly to shareholders.
Commentators too often treat corporate crime implicitly as a rare form of
altruism, in which corporate managers risk heavy fines, social stigma, and
even jail in order to increase shareholder wealth. This Article takes issue
with these characterizations. It argues that, while we should expect that
corporate officers and directors will engage in corporate crime only rarely,
when they do so, their actions often further their own interests rather than
those of their shareholders.
In particular, this Article has identified three situations in which we are
84 See, e.g., Parker, supra note 23, at 583 ("The underlying attitude of business
organizations is likely to be risk neutral.").
8 Id. at 521.
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likely to observe corporate crime. First, when a firm is performing poorly,
and managers face the prospect of a corporate reorganization or discharge
for incompetence, they may be willing to take the risks of engaging in crimi-
nal acts even when criminal conduct does note serve the best interests of the
firm's shareholders. Similarly, managers may engage in criminal conduct as
a substitute for non-criminal conduct in order to raise earnings to a sufficient
level that they avoid discharge or ouster in a hostile takeover. Finally, man-
agers may engage in criminal activity because the risks associated with
detection and punishment are less than the professional risks associated with
a poor performance.
Thus, the threat of sub-optimal performance can induce managers to
become risk preferrers relative to shareholders. For example, managers may
engage in criminal acts because they fear imminent bankruptcy. The threat
of sub-optimal performance can also lead managers to view criminal activity
as the least risky alternative available at any given time. In either of these
situations, corporate criminal conduct makes shareholders worse off,
because, all else being equal, shareholders generally prefer the corporation to
attain a particular level of earnings through honest, rather than dishonest
conduct.
Second, corporate criminality can result from imitation within a particu-
lar corporate culture. That is, the general patterns of conduct of firms in a
particular industry may signal to well-meaning, risk-averse officers and
directors that their conduct is not illegal. Finally, organizational crime may
arise from management mistake about either the applicability of certain laws
or the relevant political landscape. These misjudgments can lead to heavy
costs on corporate decisionmakers. It is unlikely that corporate criminality
resulting from either imitative behavior or mistake provides abnormal
returns to shareholders.
We should approach the subject of increased sanctions for organizational
crime with caution. Increased organizational penalties may induce corpo-
rate managers to be excessively risk-averse. What ensues is a stifling of inno-
vation and an increase in costly internal control systems--costs borne
ultimately by consumers. Once we recognize that organizational crime only
sometimes benefits the investors on whose behalf it ostensibly is undertaken,
a case-by-case approach to corporate crime seems desirable. The politiciza-
tion of the U.S. Sentencing Commission also suggests the desirability of a
case-by-case approach. Politicization makes it unlikely that policymakers
will consider the interests of innocent shareholders in formulating sentencing
guidelines.
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